The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is disparaging of the earlier editorial efforts of G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and in particular of their inclusion and titling of the material in “Part II”. I argue, on both historical and philosophical grounds, that the Editors have failed to refute the editorial decisions of Rhees and Anscombe – a failure born both of a neglect of the historical circumstances and Wittgenstein's own expressed hopes and intentions (...) for his writings, and of a myopic understanding of his philosophy. Wittgenstein's legacy has not been well served by their interventions, which should be undone in future editions. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's scant remarks on the roots of language in instinctive behaviour have been both difficult to interpret and controversial, not least because they may seem to incline towards forms of explanation that elsewhere he eschewed. Nevertheless, they are of importance in philosophy, not least because they bear upon age-old questions of foundationalism and concept-formation. In a recent Discussion Note in this journal, H. O. Mounce is not only attracted by but also champions such explanation – though he finds Wittgenstein's own (...) “explanations” inadequate in important respects, as evidenced in his misguided criticisms of Moore in On Certainty and in his behaviouristic remarks on the roots of the “cause and effect” language-game. In this response, I try to identify the philosophical roots of this attraction and the points at which Mounce's account departs from the elucidatory and non-explanatory path established by Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Healthcare ethics has become part of the standard curriculum of students in the health professions. The goals of healthcare ethics education are to give students the skills they need to identify, assess, and address ethical issues in clinical practice and to develop virtuous practitioners. Incorporating the medical humanities into medical school, for example, is intended to foster empathy and professionalism among students and to provide mechanisms for enhanced physician well-being. Yet, despite the long-standing inclusion of the humanities in nursing curricula, (...) increases in the amount and kinds of scientific knowledge essential for clinical practice has resulted in the erosion of the “humanistic arts” from nursing education. One potential solution to this challenge comes with the increase in interprofessional education, where students in a variety of healthcare professions programs come together to learn about issues common to all healthcare fields. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

In the first part of this article an attempt was made to clear the ground for a functional theory of knowledge, and the discussion of structure and function with which it concluded enables us to approach the problem of cognition. If the view already set forth is sound, it seems clear that the relation of the mind to its object is a function and not a structure of the mental processes involved. The mere existence of a mental content, however complex (...) it may be, however decorated with fringes or set off by a background, does not constitute an act of knowledge or give the content a meaning. In order to see a mental act as cognitive we must consider its function, its origin, its results, and in general the circumstances in which it stands. (shrink)

Rush Rhees identified the question of “what language is” as central to Wittgenstein's philosophy, but believed he failed to follow up adequately the connections between the reality of discourse and our reality as persons. Integral to this is Rhees's elaboration of the distinction between such investigations into language and approaches to philosophy restricted to elucidating “the grammars of particular expressions.” The failure to fully acknowledge Rhees's contribution to the understanding of these issues has vitiated recent New Wittgensteinian discussion of both (...) Wittgenstein and Rhees. (shrink)

It is a little understood fact that the system of formal logic presented in Wittgenstein?s Tractatusprovides the basis for an alternative general semantics for a predicate calculus that is consistent and coherent, essentially independent of the metaphysics of logical atomism, and philosophically illuminating in its own right. The purpose of this paper is threefold: to describe the general characteristics of a Tractarian-style semantics, to defend the Tractatus system against the charge of expressive incompleteness as levelled by Robert Fogelin, and to (...) give a semantics for a formal language that is the Tractarian equivalent of a first-order predicate calculus. Of note in regard to the latter is the fact that a Tractatusstyle truth-definition makes no appeal to the technical trick of defining truth in terms of the satisfaction of predicates by infinite sequences of objects, yet is materially equivalent to the usual Tarski-style truth-definitions. (shrink)

Anti-vivisectionists charge that animal experimenters are speciesists people who unjustly discriminate against members of other species. Until recently most defenders of experimentation denied the charge. After the publication of `The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research' in the New England Journal of Medicine , experimenters had a more aggressive reply: `I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible, it is essential for right conduct...'1. Most researchers now embrace Cohen's response as part of their defense of animal (...) experimentation. Cohen asserts that both rights and utilitarian arguments against the use of animals in research fail because they `refuse to recognize the moral differences among species'.2 If we appreciate the profound differences between humans and non-human animals, he says, we would understand why animals do not and could not have rights and why animal pain does not have as much moral weight as human pain. Animal liberationists think speciesism is immoral because they mistakenly equate it with racism and sexism. Cohen claims this equation is `unsound', `atrocious', `utterly specious', and `morally offensive'. Doubtless Cohen is right that the charge of speciesism is founded on an analogy with racism and sexism. He is mistaken, however, in asserting that the comparison is categorically illicit. (shrink)

_The American Teacher_ is a comprehensive education foundations text with an emphasis on the historical continuity of educational issues and their practical application in the classroom. Aspiring teachers enter the classrooms with an innate optimism, and the challenge of _The American Teacher_ is to engage them and to provide meaningful direction to channel their idealism. By reconnecting individuals with their society, community, and workplace, this engaging text provides education students with a grounding in their profession and an understanding of how (...) important social and political issues affect educational practice. (shrink)

We give a fairly complete account which first shows that the solution to the inner model problem for one supercompact cardinal will yield an ultimate version ofLand then shows that the various current approaches to inner model theory must be fundamentally altered to provide that solution.

This paper describes the UK Research Ethics Committee’s (REC) preparations and review of the global first SARS-CoV-2 human infection challenge studies. To frame our review, we used the WHO guidance and our UK Health Research Authority ethical review framework. The WHO criteria covered most issues we were concerned about, but we would recommend one further criterion directing RECs to consider alternative research designs. Could research questions be equally well answered by less intrusive studies? The committee met virtually, ensuring broad representation (...) across the UK nations and also ensuring applicants could attend easily. We worked in collaboration with the applicants but while we recognise that such proximity might raise the accusation of ‘collusion’, we made every effort to maintain ‘moral distance’ and all decisions were made by the committee alone. Prior existing processes and policy facilitated training and review but even with this preparation, review took time and this could have hindered a rapid response to the emergency. Review for the various follow-on studies will now be speedier and once the pandemic has subsided, our group could be reconvened in future emergencies. In conclusion, we have tried to make decisions in good faith. We know there is controversy and disagreement and reasonable people may feel we have made the wrong decision. A more detailed analysis, built on the WHO guidance, is provided in online supplemental material. (shrink)

No natural rights theory justifies strong intellectual property rights. More specifically, no theory within the entire domain of natural rights thinking – encompassing classical liberalism, libertarianism and left-libertarianism, in all their innumerable variants – coherently supports strengthening current intellectual property rights. Despite their many important differences, all these natural rights theories endorse some set of members of a common family of basic ethical precepts. These commitments include non-interference, fairness, non-worsening, consistency, universalisability, prior consent, self-ownership, self-governance, and the establishment of zones (...) of autonomy. Such commitments have clear applications pertaining to the use and ownership of created ideas. I argue that each of these commitments require intellectual property rights to be substantially limited in scope, strength and duration. In this way the core mechanisms of natural rights thinking ensure a robust public domain and categorically rule out strong intellectual property rights. (shrink)

Nussbaum seems to have had a spell during which she made villains heroes (and sometimes visa versa). Thus she has argued, in effect, that Steerforth is the hero of David Copperfield, and Heathcliff the most admirable character in Wuthering Heights. Here I discuss her more or less explicit claim that Alcibiades is the hero, (and Socrates the villain) in Plato’s Symposium. -/- .

Research Ethics, Volume 18, Issue 1, Page 3-12, January 2022. Consent is one necessary foundation for ethical research and it’s one of the research ethics committee’s major roles to ensure that the consent process meets acceptable standards. Although on Oxford ‘A’ REC we’ve been impressed by the thought and work put into this aspect of research ethics, we’ve continued to have concerns about the suitability and effectiveness of consent processes in supporting decision making, particularly for clinical trials. There’s poor understanding (...) of what people want to help them decide; current processes don’t provide the best grounding for informed consent and there’s inadequate public involvement. We’ve also found a lack of proportionality with researchers failing to adapt consent procedures in proportion to the burdens and consequences of the study. As a result, people are often not best helped to make an informed choice when asked to join a research study. To address these concerns, we considered how we might improve this aspect of research ethics review. Recognising the central importance of the dialogue between the volunteer and researcher, we’ve drawn up a model or flowchart of what we deem good consent practice, proposing consent should be built around four simple steps:Step 1: Introducing the study and the choices: helping the potential participants get an overview of the proposal and introducing the key issues.Step 2: Explaining all the details of the study using the detailed Participant Information Sheet.Step 3: After a gap, if necessary, reviewing and checking understanding.Step 4: Reaching agreement and recording consent.These steps, we believe, could help all involved and this article lays out ways we might improve participant choice while complying with accepted principles and current regulations. (shrink)

We investigate both iteration hypotheses and extender models at the level of one supercompact cardinal. The HOD Conjecture is introduced and shown to be a key conjecture both for the Inner Model Program and for understanding the limits of the large cardinal hierarchy. We show that if the HOD Conjecture is true then this provides strong evidence for the existence of an ultimate version of Gödel's constructible universe L. Whether or not this "ultimate" L exists is now arguably the central (...) issue for the Inner Model Program. (shrink)

According to one view of english nominals, imperfect nominals designate facts, and perfect nominals, events. it is argued here that this is mistaken. of imperfect nominals only "that"-clauses are fact designators; imperfect gerundive nominals are to be classed with perfect nominals as event designators. there are, however, two conceptions of events, arising from two different conceptions of time. the events designated by imperfect gerundives are to be conceived as spread out in time, divisible into parts, and such that the same (...) event may receive multiple descriptions. the events named by perfect nominals differ. they persist through time, rather than being extended in it, they do not divide into temporal parts, and obey strict conditions of identity. this position is argued for on the basis of linguistic evidence, as well as analysis of the conceptions of time involved. implications of the view for a number of philosophical problems are pointed out and briefly explored. (shrink)

In this essay I shall argue that the state should require all parents to be licensed. My main goal is to demonstrate that the licensing of parents is theoretically desirable, though I shall also argue that a workable and just licensing program actually could be established.

Research consent processes must provide potential participants with the necessary information to help them decide if they wish to join a study. On the Oxford ‘A’ Research Ethics Committee we’ve found that current research proposals mostly provide adequate detail (even if not in an easily comprehensible format), but often fail to support decision making, a view supported by published evidence. In a previous paper, we described how consent might be structured, and here we develop the concept of an Information and (...) Decision Aid (IDA) that can support decision making and be used to guide the dialogue between researcher and potential participant. Our proposal requires limited changes to current processes or paperwork and would provide an easily accessible document for others that the potential participant might approach for advice. It could later be integrated with the Informed Consent Form to ensure all matters of concern to the individual participant have been addressed before consent is formally signed off. (shrink)

El «Didascalicon» es una obra de capital importancia dentro de la literatura de carácter pedagógico surgida en la Edad Media. El autor, que redactó su obra en 1130, selecciona y define todas las áreas de conocimiento vigentes en su época, demostrando que no solo están totalmente integradas entre ellas, sino que resultan necesarias para el logro de la perfección tanto en lo referente a la vida terrenal como en lo tocante a la eterna. Dividida en seis libros, presenta una clasificación (...) nueva de la ciencia. Divide la Filosofía en cuatro ramas: Teórica, Práctica, Mecánica y Lógica. La Teórica, a su vez, comprende la Teología, la Matemática y la Física. La Filosofía Práctica consta de tres partes: moral personal, moral administrativa o privada y moral civil o pública. La Mecánica tiene seis ramas: el lanificio o arte textil, la fabricación de armas, la agricultura la caza, la medicina y el arte teatral. La Lógica abarca la gramática y la teoría de la argumentación. La obra fue escrita para los estudiantes que acudían a la Escuela de San Víctor y su finalidad, que el mismo Hugo señala en el prefacio, es establecer normas para sacar el máximo provecho a su estudio. La obra se presenta aquí por primera vez en edición bilingüe latín-castellano, con una traducción ampliamente contrastada y un completo estudio preliminar. (shrink)

The most important, or at least the most central, part of Ferdinand de Saussure's Course in General Linguistics is found in the first six chaptersof Part Two. Here, Saussure formulates one of the basic principles of Structuralism. Yet the text is in some ways oddly impenetrable. It is dear enough on a quick reading, but closer attention discovers doubtful meanings, ambiguity, the beginnings even of contradictions. These defects may, of course, be inevitable in a reconstructed text. Or they may testify (...) to some profound erroneousness in the thought, to a theory whose natal difficulties are symptoms, not of the elusiveness of truth, but of a miscarriage. It is mypurpose here to argue the latter. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that the bodily actions of men typicaly involve a mental action of voliton or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least one important sense, the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise an arm, move a finger, or flex a muscle.

Biomedical experimentation on animals is justified, researchers say, because of its enormous benefits to human being. Sure an imals die a nd suffer , but that is m orally insignificant since the benefits of research incalculably outweigh the evils. Although this utilitarian claim appears straightforward and uncontroversial, it is neither straightforw ard n ot uncontroversial. This defense of animal experimentation is like ly to succeed only by rejecting three widely held moral presumptions. W e identify those presumptions and explain their (...) relevance to the justification of animal experimentation. We argue that even if non-human animals have con side rable less moral worth than humans, experimentation is justified only if its benefits are overwhelming. By building on arguments offered in earlier papers, we show that research ers c ann ot substantiate their claims of behalf of animal research. We conclude that there is currently no acceptable utilitarian defense of animal experimentation. Moreover, it is unlikely that they could be one. Since most apologists of animal experimentation rely on utilitarian justifications of their practice, it appears that biomedical experimentation on animals is not morally justified. (shrink)

How should an acknowledgement of contingency affect our understanding of moral identity? The book considers various ways of thinking about this question in contemporary moral and political theory. Drawing on the work of Gadamer, Ricoeur, Taylor and others, it defends a realist but pluralist 'strong hermeneutic' view.

This chapter provides a framing for this volume by reviewing the significance and the organisational, technical and social opportunities and challenges related to plant data linkage. We review what “responsible practice” means in relation to the plant environments being documented, the infrastructures used to circulate data, the institutions involved in data governance and the communities involved in plant data work. We show how, across these domains, responsible plant data linkage involves consideration of technical, legal, ethical and conceptual dimensions, thereby: (1) (...) creating and maintaining digital infrastructures, technical standards and discussion venues focused on critical data reuse; (2) developing adequate legal and institutional frameworks that work transnationally; (3) identifying and implementing guidelines for what constitutes acceptable data use, together with systems to monitor and allocate responsibility for breaches and mistakes; and (4) considering the variety of views on what constitutes agricultural development in the first place and how plant research can sustainably, reliably and responsibly contribute to achieving food security. The production of sustainable, responsible and reliable agricultural solutions in the face of climatic and political change depends on the flourishing of transnational, interdisciplinary collaborations such as those represented in this volume. (shrink)

This article explores the problem of justice between age-groups. Specifically, it presents a challenge to a leading theory in this field, Norman Daniels' Prudential Lifespan Account. The challenge relates to a key assumption that underlies this theory, namely the assumption that all individuals live complete lives of equal length. Having identified the roles that this assumption plays, the article argues that the justifications Daniels offers for it are unsatisfactory and that this threatens the foundation of his position, undermining his claim (...) that ‘the fact that we all age’ makes age a special problem of distributive justice. This shows that the problem of justice between age-groups is not special in the way Daniels proposes; rather it involves the same irreducibly interpersonal distributive decisions as other problems of justice. The consequences of this argument are several-fold. Most importantly, it shows that the Rawlsian account of justice to which Daniels hopes to attach his theory to requires significantly greater benefits to be conferred on those in earlier age-groups relative to those in later age-group, not a distribution similar to simultaneous equality as Daniels proposes. (shrink)

This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains (...) three essays that defend the view that free and responsible action is incompatible with determinism, largely by arguing for a noncausal account of reasons explanation of action. The final group contains two essays on intention formation and rationality; the first argues that it is sometimes rational to form intentions that are inconsistent with each other or with one’s beliefs; the second argues that an important sort of practical reasoning has as its conclusion the forming of an intention for action, rather than the adopting of a belief as to what one should do. (shrink)

Distrust in scientific experts can be surprisingly stubborn, persisting despite evidence supporting the experts’ views, demonstrations of their competence, or displays of good will. This stubborn distrust is often viewed as a manifestation of irrationality. By contrast, this article proposes a logic of “status distrust”: low-status individuals are objectively vulnerable to collective decision-making, and can justifiably distrust high-status scientific experts if they are not confident that the experts do not have their best interests at heart. In phenomena of status distrust, (...) social status is thus an indicator of distrust, and this has wider implications for the literatures on trust in science and on expert communication. (shrink)

The dominant view today on evolutionary progress is that it has been thoroughly debunked. Even value-neutral progress concepts are seen to lack important theoretical underpinnings: natural selection provides no rationale for progress, and natural selection need not even be invoked to explain large-scale evolutionary trends. In this paper I challenge this view by analysing how natural selection acts in heterogeneous environments. This not only undermines key debunking arguments, but also provides a selectionist rationale for a pattern of “evolutionary unfolding”, where (...) life radiates across an increased range of exploitation of environmental heterogeneity. (shrink)

Codes of ethics currently offer no guidance to scientists acting in capacity of expert. Yet communicating their expertise is one of the most important activities of scientists. Here I argue that expert communication has a specifically ethical dimension, and that experts must face a fundamental trade-off between "actionability" and "transparency" when communicating. Some recommendations for expert communication are suggested.

According to a rights view it is acceptable to kill animals if they are innocent threats or shields or are in a lifeboat situation. However, according to advocates of such a view, our practices of killing animals for food or scientific research may be morally unacceptable. In this paper we argue that, even if we grant the basic assumptions of a rights view, a good deal of killing of animals for food and scientific research continues to be morally acceptable.

The dominant view on the ethics of cognitive enhancement (CE) is that CE is beholden to the principle of autonomy. However, this principle does not seem to reflect commonly held ethical judgments about enhancement. Is the principle of autonomy at fault, or should common judgments be adjusted? Here I argue for the first, and show how common judgments can be justified as based on a principle of service.

Technoscientific research, a kind of scientific research conducted within the decontextualized approach (DA), uses advanced technology to produce instruments, experimental objects, and new objects and structures, that enable us to gain knowledge of states of affairs of novel domains, especially knowledge about new possibilities of what we can do and make, with the horizons of practical, industrial, medical or military innovation, and economic growth and competition, never far removed from view. The legitimacy of technoscientific innovations can be appraised only in (...) the course of considering fully what sorts of objects technoscientific objects are: objects that embody scientific knowledge confirmed within DA; physical/chemical/biological objects, realizations of possibilities discovered in research conducted within DA, brought to realization by means of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions; and components of social/ecological systems, objects that embody the values of technological progress and (most of them) values of capital and the market. What technoscientific objects are - their powers, tendencies, sources of their being, effects on human beings and social/economic systems, how they differ from non technoscientific objects - cannot be grasped from technoscientific inquiry alone; scientific inquiry that is not reducible to that conducted within DA is also needed. The knowledge that underlies and explains the efficacy of technoscientific objects is never sufficient to grasp what sorts of object they are and could become. Science cannot be reduced to technoscience. (shrink)

Mother Teresa spends her life caring for the poor and the infirm; J. Paul Getty, Jr., spends his life making investments and directing corporations. Although we might be unhappy doing what they do, we assume they are satisfied. Mother Teresa enjoys her work and would be miserable if she had to mastermind corporate takeovers. Getty would be wretched if he had to care for lepers or become a lawn chair salesman.

Many of us assume we must either oppose or support gun control. Not so. We have a range of alternatives. Even this way of speaking oversimplifies our choices since there are two distinct scales on which to place alternatives. One scale concerns the degree (if at all) to which guns should be abolished. This scale moves from those who want no abolition (NA) of any guns, through those who want moderate abolition (MA) - to forbid access to some subclasses of (...) guns - to those who want absolute abolition (AA). The second scale concerns the restrictions (if any) on those guns that are available to private citizens. This scale moves from those who want absolute restrictions (AR) through those who want moderate restrictions (MR) to those who want no restrictions (NR) at all. Restrictions vary not only in strength but also in content. We could restrict who owns guns, how they obtain them, where and how they store them, and where and how they can carry them. (shrink)

In Analysis, Vol. 45, June 1984, George Rea published a paper attacking my claim that there could be ‘indeterminate minds'. This paper is a reply to his attack. I claim, again, that such ‘minds’ are possible – entities such that it is indeterminate whether or not these entities are people with minds. -/- .

In 1974 Putnam was a ‘realist’ in regard to the physical world. By 1981 he had become a 'non-realist' in this regard. (I don’t know where he stands today.) In this paper I argue that his realism was more plausible than his non-realism. The physical world is what it is independently of any rational being’s interpretation of it.

The success of precision medicine depends on obtaining large amounts of information about at-risk populations. However, getting consent is often difficult. Why? In this commentary I point to the differentials in social status involved. These differentials are inevitable once personal information is surrendered, but are particularly intense when the studied populations are socioeconomically or socioculturally disadvantaged and/or ethnically stigmatized groups. I suggest how the deep distrust of the latter groups can be partially justified as a lack of confidence that their (...) core values or interests will sufficiently be taken into account. Hence, the ethical challenge here lies not in avoiding status differentials, but in dealing with them appropriately. Scientists should not assume trust from others but adopt a norm of “demonstrating trustworthiness”. (shrink)